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INtRoduCtIoN
Insufficient attention has been given to moral issues surrounding 
consumption (Hilton 2004; Miller 2001). Moreover, in spite of the 
exhaustive empirical coverage of the moral status of animals, both 
from a philosophical and political perspective and the belief that 
“consumption is in essence a moral matter” (Wilk 2001, p.246), 
very little empirical consideration has been given to the moral issues 
relating to the consumption practices associated with pet ownership1 
(Kwak, Zinkhan and French 2001). In general, studies on morality 
consider the subject in terms of the rightness or wrongness of an 
individual’s behavior as guided by a societal code of conduct agreed 
to by the members of that particular society (Shaw 1991; Wallace and 
Walker 1970). However, in outlining a sociological view of moral-
ity, Caruana’s (2007a, p.295)  constructivist perspective suggests a 
broader, more fluid and subjective interpretation of morality. As this 
perspective acknowledges the “dialectic relationship between society 
and the morality of those individuals who constitute it,” Caruana 
(2007a, p.299) argues further that a constructivist approach may 
be more “useful in a contemporary society no longer characterized 
by dominant institutions.” 
Sometimes the terms “morality” and “ethics” are used inter-
changeably, (particularly within the consumer research literature), 
however we follow Caruana’s (2007a, p.288) distinction that while 
morality is concerned with defining right and wrong for an individual 
or community, ethics relates to “the formal rationalization of moral-
ity.” Thus, ethics pertains to one’s inner view of what is right and 
wrong and our mode of action. Morality on the other hand “serves to 
restrain our purely self-interested desires” so that we can co-operate 
together (Shaw 1991, p.19). However, since moral interpretations of 
right and wrong vary between individuals within a society and are 
moreover continually transforming (see also Luedicke, Thompson 
and Giesler 2010) we would agree with Caruana (2007a, p.300) 
that it is necessary to view “morality in consumption as a process 
of social construction [which] will allow interpretations to absorb 
the various alternative strands of social meaning that appear relevant 
in people’s consumption practices.” Therefore, a useful framework 
to help explore the “process through which individuals or cultures 
come to view issues or behavior as possessing moral properties” 
is Lovett and Jordan’s (2010, p.177) model of moralization. Build-
ing on Rozin’s (1997) conceptualization of moralization, Lovett 
and Jordan (2010) advocate a ‘graduation-based’ descriptive 
model which comprises of four levels of moralization that could 
take place in any given situation (i.e. Level 0–simple preferences 
with no moralization, Level 1–preferences moralized for the self, 
Level 2–preferences moralized for the self and others and Level 
3-public expression of moralization). Consequently, we argue that 
their model offers a constructive and nuanced perspective of moral 
sensitivity which will help to enrich our understanding of the role of 
moralization amongst pet owners and their consumption practices.
Although no single theory can “claim to have the dynamics 
of consumption entirely pinned down” (Caruana 2007b,p. 210), 
a comprehensive framework that seeks to illuminate consump-
tion from a constructivist perspective is Holt’s (1995) Typology 
of Consumption Practices. However, comprehensive though the 
framework is, it does not unequivocally acknowledge the moral 
dimensions of consumption. We would argue that this may well be 
a reflection of the fact that few studies focusing on consumption 
actually consider moral issues unless their focus is disposal and/
or ecological behaviors (Caruana 2007a; 2007b; Kwak et al. 2001; 
Luedicke et al. 2010). If we accept Wilk’s (2001) assertion that 
consumption is a moral matter, it follows perforce that in order to 
remain relevant to contemporary analyses of consumption Holt’s 
(1995) typology might be usefully extended so as to incorporate 
the moral dimensions of consumption. 
Accordingly, this paper examines the social construction of 
morality in the context of consumption practices associated with 
pet ownership in the UK. Hence, the contribution of this article 
is twofold; first, we develop and propose extending Holt’s (1995) 
typology of consumption practices to help align the fields of moral-
ity and consumer behavior research so as to describe consumption 
practices more fully. Second, we contribute to current knowledge 
regarding the role of morality and socio-cultural influences in rela-
tion to owners and their pets. 
IdENtIFyINg A PlACE FoR MoRAlIty IN 
Holt’S (1995) tyPology oF  
CoNSuMPtIoN PRACtICES 
Rather than reiterate a description of Holt’s (1995) four meta-
phors and the consumption practices in which they are embedded, 
the following paragraphs focus on how his typology may be use-
fully extended so as to incorporate some of the moral dimensions 
of consumption. 
Holt (1995) suggests that consumers’ autotelic subjective 
emotional experiences of consumption objects are embedded in 
accounting, evaluating and appreciating practices. He argues that 
consumers engage in accounting practices when they draw on an 
institutional framework in order to make sense of their consumption 
experience and that they engage in evaluating practices when they 
“apply this framework to pass judgment on the situations, people 
and actions they encounter” (Holt 1995, p.5). Whilst it would be 
impossible to list all of the institutional frameworks that pet owners 
may draw upon, if we take the example of those associated with the 
Kennel Club (est. 1873), the Governing Council of the Cat Fancy 
(est. 1910) as well as other registered breeding clubs, we would 
argue that certain evaluating practices may well encourage the 
treatment of animals as aesthetic objects and ignore the impact of 
this on animal health (Hirschman 1994). This has led to widespread 
discussion regarding the morality of humankind’s manipulation of 
certain pedigree breeds with correspondingly deep rooted divisions 
among pet owners (and others) regarding the ethics of purchasing 
certain types of pedigrees that are considered acceptable (e.g. 
Labrador) over others that are considered problematic (e.g. King 
Charles Spaniels and syringomyelia), the purchasing of mongrels 
rather than pedigrees and/or the purchase of animals from shelters 
and rescue homes versus purchasing from animal breeders. Holt 
1Note that the conversations surrounding whether or not animals 
have value, rights or interests are outwith the remit of this paper. 
However, it is fair to acknowledge at the outset that whilst accept-
ing the blurring of the boundaries between humans and animals 
(see for example Holbrook et al. 2001), our starting point is that 
we [and our participants] perceive the keeping of pets as morally 
acceptable and therefore may be more inclined towards a welfarist 
view as opposed to an animal rights stance. 
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explains that “appreciating taps the full range of emotional responses” 
(1995, p.5). Indeed, the human-animal literature widely documents 
owners as having an emotional attachment to their pet (i.e. recognizing 
the pet as being a friend and/or part of the family). Whilst in itself 
this does not provoke moral concern it does raise moral questions 
when the love and attachment to that animal causes harm. 
Holt suggests that integrating practices are instrumental bi-
directional symbolic acts in that consumers both symbolically draw 
external objects into their self concept (via producing and personalizing 
practices) and “reorient their self concept so that it aligns with an 
institutionally defined identity” (1995, p.6) (via assimilating prac-
tices). With regard to pet owners, key facets of assimilation include 
being able to demonstrate a sufficient “degree of competence”–that 
is, “thinking like, feeling like…and looking like” a competent pet 
owner (Holt 1995, p.7). Manifestations of these practices might 
include owners’ efforts to develop their knowledge relating to their 
pets’ behavior and welfare, which raises all sorts of moral and ethical 
dilemmas regarding appropriate diets, grooming regimes (the clip-
ping of cats’ claws) and whether or not to attend training/obedience 
classes (for dogs). 
Classifying practices involve both classifying via an established 
association with the object itself (i.e. owning a pedigree/mongrel 
cat or dog) and classifying through actions, where “what matters is 
how one interacts with the object” (1995, p.11). In the context of pet 
ownership, examples of classifying practices might include using a 
dog as a weapon to communicate a masculine image or using a cat 
or dog as a fashion accessory to communicate status. 
Finally, playing is an autotelic interaction and is embedded in 
both communing practices, which index the mutual experience of 
consuming and in socializing practices, where “playing often takes 
on a more performative, reciprocal style” in which consumers use 
their experiences to “entertain each other” (1995, p.9). There are 
clearly moral aspects to the socializing practices that revolve around 
the use of animals for human amusement. Certainly the competitive 
arena of the cat/dog show and other animal performances (e.g. circus 
animals) may be perceived by some as exploiting animals and/or 
treating them in a “grotesque and cruel fashion in order that humans 
might be amused” (Belk 1996, p.121).
Identifying some of these moral issues within each of Holt’s 
(1995) metaphors strengthens our rationale for re-working Holt’s 
typology. Consequently, we propose that these areas may be addressed 
by adding a new dimension, namely consuming as moralization. As 
shown in Figure 1 above, we have placed this metaphor at the center 
of Holt’s (1995) typology, in order to demonstrate that consumer 
moralization embraces both autotelic and instrumental as well as 
object and interpersonal actions. This is discussed in more detail in 
our findings below, but prior to this discussion, the next section de-
scribes the methodological approach that we adopted to elicit stories 
from our participants concerning their cats and dogs. 
A PHoto-ElICItAtIoN APPRoACH
Our approach utilizes a technique known as autodriving (Heis-
ley and Levy 1991) which describes a particular photo-elicitation 
technique whereby visual and/or audio recordings of informants 
are made by the researcher and then used as projective devices for 
interviewing (Prosser and Schwartz 1998). Following Zaltman and 
Coulter (1995) and Holbrook et al. (2001), our participants took 
their own photographs. We initially contacted four people known 
to us and via personal referrals, our initial convenience sample of 
four snowballed to a total of eighteen.2 Our interviews followed 
what Thompson, Locander and Pollio (1989) call the phenom-
enological interview, with the aim of yielding a conversation. So, 
with the exception of the opening question, the interview had no 
a priori questions concerning the topic. With permission from the 
participants, interviews were audio-taped and lasted from one to 
three hours. The verbatim transcripts were then independently and 
collectively reviewed by the two authors to identify broad themes. 
FIguRE 1
Metaphors for Consuming and Consumption Practices in the Context of Pet Ownership
 PuRPoSE oF ACtIoN         
 AUTOTELIC INSTRUMENTAL
 
 Consuming as Experience Consuming as Integration
	 •Accounting		 •Assimilating	
	 •Evaluating		 •Producing	
	 •Appreciating	 •Personalising
 
  
      Consuming as Play   Consuming as Classification
	 •Communing		 •Through	objects
	 •Socialising	 •Through	actions
  
Source:  Adapted from Holt (1995, p.3). Extensions are highlighted in italics.
oBJECt
ACtIoNS
INtER-
PERSoNAl
ACtIoNS
Consuming as
Moralization
	 •Nurturing
	 •Protecting
STRUCTURE
OF
ACTION
2Note that pseudonyms are adopted when referring to participants 
and their pets throughout the remainder of this paper.
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tHE MoRAl dIMENSIoNS oF PEt owNERS’ 
CoNSuMPtIoN PRACtICES 
The photographs played a key role in stimulating participants 
to tell stories about their pet’s character and behavior and the myriad 
ways in which their lives are intertwined. A total of fifteen pets 
(eight cats and seven dogs) were currently owned by participants. 
Their pets were acquired from public spaces (i.e. strays), rescue 
shelters, family relations (i.e. gifts) and pedigree breeders. Owner 
relationships with their pets also ranged from family pet or com-
panion animal (i.e. partner/child substitute) to that of a working 
relationship (i.e. guide dog trainer/doggie daycare provider).
Moralization and Experiential Practices
Many of our participants own pedigree animals and the acqui-
sition and subsequent sense-making of the role(s) of these animals 
in the lives of these owners are informed by a variety of values 
and beliefs. Helen recalls telling her late husband that she wanted 
“some nice pedigree kittens.” In response he bought her “a little 
book with all pedigree cats in” and she decided that she liked the 
Abyssinians because of their pretty faces. Thus, Helen’s evalua-
tion regarding which cat to purchase was primarily aesthetic and 
indeed this was reinforced and clearly influenced by the fact that 
her late husband “really wanted to have a show animal.” We will 
discuss the showing of her Abyssinian cat further in the section on 
moralization and classification practices; it suffices to say here that 
in terms of sense-making, Helen viewed Agatha as both a family pet 
and a show animal, at least for a short time, with no apparent moral 
concerns. Although Mandy has no inclination to show her English 
Cocker spaniel, she spoke of her concerns regarding the breeding 
of pedigrees for the purposes of money-making and therefore not 
buying her dog “from a puppy farm type place-you know where 
they just take your order-they are obviously just breeding bitches 
just to make money…and so we didn’t want that.” Alison is clearly 
much less interested in physical appearances and is rather more 
concerned in animals/dogs for their own sake (i.e. the autotelic 
aspects), thus her evaluation of the Labrador breed as “a good, 
honest, down to earth dog” is based on temperament and behavior 
rather than aesthetics and clearly reflects the culturally accepted 
interpretation of this breed as a good family pet. In comparison to 
Helen, Alison and Mandy are both rather contemptuous of those 
who show animals (see later section on moralizing and classification 
practices). Thus, when Alison discusses Patsy’s role in her life she 
says “Patsy is just a pet…we’ve got no want or need to show her 
at all, she is just our family pet.” 
The most significant appreciating practices involve feeding, 
training and caring for their animals. Although these practices 
themselves do not raise moral questions, they do provoke moral 
concern if they cause harm to the animal. Notably, none of our 
participants were identified as overfeeding, spoiling or training 
their pets to the point of causing harm. In some cases, a sense of 
“tough love” was apparent when it came to training their pets, but 
this was to ensure the safety of the pet rather than for the kudos of 
owning or exhibiting a well-trained pet. The levels of moralization 
exhibited by our participants in relation to each of the three practices 
within which consuming as experience is embedded are identified 
as being mostly Level 1 preferences. That is, the participants mor-
alize their preferences for themselves but not for others. However, 
some participants, including Helen, do not appear to moralize their 
preferences (i.e. Level 0) with regard to experiential practices at 
all, although as we shall see in later sections Helen does engage 
in various levels of moralization in relation to other consumption 
practices. The fact that none of our participants appear to engage 
in level 2 moralizing here is perhaps not surprising given that ex-
periential practices relate to their personal, subjective and autotelic 
experiences of living with their pets. We pick up on the feeding, 
training and caring practices again from an instrumental perspec-
tive in the next section on moralization and integration practices.
Moralization and Integration Practices
With regard to the producing and personalizing practices related 
to the identity of our participants as pet owners, by far the most 
common theme was that of the “rescuer.” For example, Judith saw 
“an advert for a dog that a chap couldn’t keep [and] went to see 
her…she wasn’t exactly what I thought of as having as a dog. But 
then once I’d seen her, I felt like she’d kind of chosen me…I would 
have felt guilty if I hadn’t had her.” Alison rescued both her current 
dog and her first dog, recounting the story of the latter as follows: 
“she was an accident…they were going to put her in a bucket, so…I 
came home with her smuggled under my coat.” 
Similar to Holt’s (1995) discussion of assimilating practices, 
our participants used a variety of techniques in order to become 
competent participants within the social world of pet ownership, 
especially with regard to training and feeding. While we recognize 
that consumers can communicate their identity as competent pet 
owners by having a well trained pet, we would argue that there 
may be moral issues associated with assimilating practices such 
as intensive training regimes. Perhaps given the more acquiescent 
nature of dogs compared to cats, training was discussed mainly by 
our dog owners/trainers. One mode of intensive training perceived 
to provide a valuable service to society but considered morally 
questionable as far as the quality of life of the dog is concerned is 
the training of guide-dogs for the blind. Speaking about her expe-
rience of training guide-dogs, Laura felt angered by the fact that 
some guide-dog owners “perhaps didn’t love dogs quite as much 
as you wanted and were using it [i.e. the dog] as a tool” rather 
than a pet. Moreover, she felt that it was more natural for a dog to 
be used for police work as a police dog is “doing what their nose 
tells them and everything, whereas guiding…they are not allowed 
to scavenge and they are not allowed to chase other things and 
they are not allowed to play when they are in harness. It’s really 
a lot of training against their instincts.” For our participants, the 
primary motivation for training their dogs was mainly to protect 
the safety of their pet and other owner’s pets rather than to produce 
a super-trained, obedient pet. Here, Claire “had to start from the 
basics...get him [Angus] to walk to heel…and it’s just taken pretty 
much all that time to feel confident about going out and letting him 
be round other dogs.” As indicated earlier, concerning the feeding 
of their pets, our participants did not spoil or over-feed their pets. 
Instead, dietary regimes were often seen as being instrumental in 
maintaining the health of their pet. For example, Millie states that 
she buys IAMS, which was “recommended to me by a vet because 
they said that the biscuits were good for getting rid of plaque on 
their teeth.” Many of our participants further demonstrated their 
competence as pet owners by their ability to judge between good 
and bad kennel or cattery services. Here, Stewart explained that 
they “had to take them [Agatha and Brady] to another one [cat-
tery] last year, because it was sort of last minute” but that Helen 
“wouldn’t take them up there again.” Helen elaborated further as 
to the reasons why: “the enclosures were closed in on all sides, 
so the cats couldn’t see out...when I went, they looked frightened; 
they didn’t look comfortable”. Among our participants, we find 
no evidence of preferences that are not moralized at all (i.e. Level 
0) in relation to integrating practices and though it is difficult to 
measure this as such, it seems that there are more preferences that 
are moralized for the self (i.e. Level 1) here than there are in relation 
to experiential practices. However, Laura’s views regarding the use 
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of guide-dogs points to a higher level of moralizing, namely the 
moralization of preferences for herself and for others (i.e. Level 
2). We would speculate that where consumption practices have an 
instrumental rather than an autotelic focus, moral issues are more 
likely to come to the fore.
Moralization and Playing Practices 
Both our cat and dog owners engaged in socializing and com-
muning practices although few moral issues arose concerning the 
practice of communing. One example however, concerns Sheila 
whose cats helped to facilitate the sharing of cat-owning experiences 
with her neighbors. Here she felt that it was morally objectionable 
that cat owners should opt to keep their cats inside–“to me you can’t 
keep a cat indoors, a cat’s a free spirit you’ve got to let them go out.” 
Regarding socializing practices and moral issues, our partici-
pants held mixed views towards the competitive arena of pet shows 
for the purpose of human entertainment. Of those who expressed 
positive attitudes towards the competitive showing of pets, it was 
evident that the owners continued to view their animals as pets rather 
than as objects of avocation. Helen was informed by the breeder 
that Agatha would make a good show animal and although her and 
her husband did show Agatha, Helen went on to explain that they 
stopped attending shows after a while partly because she was not 
that interested but also because “Agatha didn’t like going.” Thus, 
in the interests of the cat, she considered it morally inappropriate 
to continue showing her. Similarly, Sheila felt that Marmelstein’s 
“markings are perfect [and that] she would actually have done 
quite well but she’s a pet.” Although not expressing either an anti-
pet show or pro-pet show stance, some participants discussed the 
less serious aspects of pet showing. This was particularly evident 
amongst pet-owning households with children as they spoke of their 
experiences at fun dog shows. Here Michelle and Anne talked about 
Jake’s foray into the waggiest tail and cutest eye competitions and 
laughed as they recounted his fiasco as a performer in that “when he 
was doing the waggiest tail–he sat down! And when he was doing 
the cutest eyes he wouldn’t sit.” In comparison to the positive and 
more neutral views, other participants were rather contemptuous 
of those who show animals. Here Laura felt that organizers and 
judges of competitive pet shows exist “in their own little bubble 
and they go, isn’t it beautiful and look at its head-look at the size 
of the head–fantastic.” She then continues to criticize owners 
who partake in competitive showing by questioning the morality 
of certain breeders who manipulate certain breeds despite health 
problems (e.g. manipulating a larger head for the Bulldog breed 
despite being unable to give birth naturally as a result). This moral 
issue will be discussed again in the next section on moralizing and 
classification practices from an instrumental perspective.
None of our participants commented specifically on the mo-
rality of animals being utilized solely as performers (e.g. circus 
animals) but in contrast to the perhaps more exploitative nature of 
competitive pet shows, agility shows were seen more as playful 
experiences for both the owner and their pet. For example, Mandy 
feels that “the agility’s just fun...it’s just like the egg and spoon 
race for dogs isn’t it?” Laura used to take Fifi to a local dog agility 
club but despite her enjoyment of performing together as a team 
in an autotelic way (e.g. “she’s looking at you and there is just the 
two of you in a partnership”), she felt that after completing the 
training, the club organizers lay enormous pressure on members 
to participate in competitions and subsequently she stopped going. 
Various levels of moralization are exhibited by our participants in 
relation to playing practices. While Michelle and Anne do not ap-
pear to engage in moralizing their preferences at all (i.e. Level 0), 
a number of participants (e.g. Helen and Sheila) moralized their 
preferences for themselves but not for others (i.e. Level 1). How-
ever, those participants who are strongly against the exploitative 
nature of both animal shows and agility competitions moralize their 
preferences both for themselves and others (i.e. Level 2). That we 
find more evidence of Level 2 moralizing here in comparison to 
experiential and integrating practices, is perhaps to be expected 
given that playing practices are interpersonally structured while the 
previous practices are structured around the relationship between 
consumers and consumption objects (Holt 1995); here between pet 
owners and their pets.
Moralization and Classification Practices
None of our participants engaged in classifying practices such as 
using a dog as a weapon or using a cat or dog as a fashion accessory 
to communicate status. However, many of our participants spoke of 
such classifying practices within their respective neighborhoods. 
Laura was concerned by the rising number of “trophy dogs” in her 
local area. Wilma also moralizes about this issue and believes it 
to be a problem with the owner rather than the dog–“they are not 
exercised and they are stir crazy and then it gives that breed a bad 
name, when really, most of the time it’s the owner and that they 
are not exercised enough.” 
The classifying practice of using pets as a fashion statement 
is also considered as morally reprehensible. In particular, Alison 
questioned such owner’s motives for owning these animals by 
suggesting that they were not “getting a dog for family reasons…
they’re not getting it to enhance their lives in any way…they are 
just getting it as a fashion accessory.” Also linked to the notion of 
animals serving as a fashion accessory is the dressing-up of pets. 
While some participants feel that dressing up pets is cruel and ex-
ploitative, others do not object to people who do this but emphasize 
that they would not do this themselves. For example, Sheila states 
“no…you couldn’t do that to them-that’s cruel.” Whereas Judith 
feels that she could “never be someone that would put bows in 
their hair and put little coats and boots on [but] Poodles or Toy 
Poodles…these sort of people might put bows in their hair or carry 
them in shopping bags.” 
In relation to the moral issues surrounding breed manipulation 
but from an instrumental perspective, none of the participants own 
a designer breed or hybrid. Of the participants who own a pure-
bred pet, animal breed selection tends to be based more on breed 
characteristics and personal preferences rather than an attempt to 
“enhance distinction” (Holt 1995, p.10). However, as hinted at 
above, some participants are clearly uneasy with regard to animal-
breed manipulation. While Helen talked enthusiastically about her 
preference for the Abyssinian breed, she expressed disapproval of 
the growing intervention of breeders meddling to produce cats’ 
faces that were “shoved out or pushed in.” Commenting on the 
Munchkin cat, Sam and Wilma also feel that such practices are 
inappropriate–“she [the breeder] deliberately bred cats so that 
they had little tiny like dwarf legs...for me, that’s wrong.” For the 
most part, our participants moralized about classifying practices 
in relation to themselves and others (i.e. Level 2). However, with 
regard to the dressing-up of animals, some focused only on moral 
preferences for themselves (i.e. Level 1). Similar to our analysis 
of integrating practices, there was very little evidence of our par-
ticipants displaying preferences that are not moralized in relation 
to classifying practices.
CoNSuMINg AS MoRAlIZAtIoN
Various levels of moralization permeate the preferences of our 
participants in relation to each of Holt’s (1995) ten consumption 
practices in which the various metaphorical meanings of consump-
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tion are embedded. However, in order to integrate the moral aspects 
of consumption more formally, we propose the addition of a fifth 
dimension consuming as moralization and that this should be 
placed at the centre of Holt’s typology (see Figure 1). This central 
positioning represents the fact that moralization embraces both the 
autotelic and instrumental aspects of Holt’s (1995) vertical axis (i.e. 
purpose of action) as well as the object and interpersonal aspects of 
his horizontal axis (i.e. structure of action). We suggest furthermore 
that moralization is embedded in two specific consumption practices, 
namely nurturing and protecting, which we will now discuss in turn. 
Our research lends support to McKechnie and Tynan’s (2006) 
suggestion that nurturing ought to be added to Holt’s framework. 
While these authors do not address the issue of how nurturing might 
be incorporated into the typology, we suggest that nurturing is one of 
the consumption practices within which moralization is embedded. 
Nurturing practices embrace two aspects of the interrelationship 
between pet owners and (their) animals; namely taking responsibility 
and educating humans. Nurturing practices are particularly relevant 
in terms of pet owners taking responsibility for the wellbeing of their 
animals. For our participants, this aspect of nurturing is primarily 
autotelic, although for other pet owners it may well serve a more 
instrumental purpose (i.e. obeying the law on animal welfare; feeding 
and training in relation to identity, which clearly link with integrat-
ing practices). In terms of Holt’s (1995) structure of action, taking 
responsibility for one’s pet embraces both object actions (between 
owner and pet) and interpersonal actions (i.e. within the family and 
in relation to others in the neighborhood). Among our participants, 
many acknowledged the greater responsibility of looking after a dog 
compared to a cat and they went to some considerable lengths in 
order to meet this responsibility. For example Claire moved to the 
countryside so that her dog Angus would be away from busy roads 
and Judith identified suitable doggie day care services before she 
began to look for a dog. Many of our participants clearly construe 
the notion of taking responsibility not just in terms of their personal 
responsibility for their respective pets but also at a societal level 
(i.e. the responsibility of mankind in relation to the practices as-
sociated with keeping pets). Hence the level 2 moralizing that was 
exhibited among our participants in relation to the broader aspects 
of the pet industry, which they directed towards such practices as 
intense breeding, competitive showing and the use and treatment 
of animals as status objects (trophy dogs and fashion accessories). 
With regard to the developmental and educational aspects of 
pet keeping and in support of Hirschman’s (1994, p.623) findings, 
some families keep pets “to help teach children to be responsible 
and nurturant.” Here, Sheila believes strongly that keeping pets is 
important in part “because it teaches them how to look after other 
things and it also teaches them about life and death.” Similarly, 
Alison feels that it is “a key part of growing up to role play and 
take care of animals.” To the extent that pets play an important role 
in the (moral) development and education of humans, this aspect 
of nurturing practices serves an instrumental purpose which is 
interpersonally structured. 
Moralization is also embedded in a second set of practices, 
which we term protecting practices. Protecting practices embrace 
two aspects; safeguarding and insuring. In terms of safeguarding, 
our participants engage in a host of creative measures designed 
for the largely autotelic purpose of shielding their pets from harm. 
For example, the safeguarding of cats around main roads is an 
issue for Simon who discussed his exit route to prevent DJ from 
following him to the shops as follows: “what I’ve got to do is give 
him a fresh bowl of food, quickly put the alarm on and lock the 
door, run down the back pass and meet Chris, we both can’t go out 
together because he will follow us.” While these activities focus on 
the interactions between our participants and their pets (i.e. object 
actions) for largely autotelic reasons, they could also be construed 
instrumentally in the sense that if their animals were to stray onto 
busy roads and cause a crash their owners would most likely be 
held accountable. This is mitigated to some extent by insuring 
practices, which we will discuss shortly. Micro-chipping is another 
safeguarding practice against pet loss, as Jane suggests; “if anything 
happened he can be scanned, he’s on a register so they can scan 
him and find us.” A final safeguarding practice was brought to our 
attention by Laura, who runs a doggie day care business with her 
husband. She informed us that she is keen to advise her customers 
of the benefits of castrating male dogs, as she explains; “if you get a 
van full of male dogs that are not castrated...we might have trouble. 
I don’t think they [her customers] realize...but because he smells 
like an un-castrated dog, they [other dogs] will attack him for it.” 
As indicated already, for the most part safeguarding practices serve 
an autotelic purpose, which is structured around the interaction 
between pet owners and their (precious) animals. However, as with 
nurturing practices, many of our participants also view protecting at 
a broader, societal level. In this regard, as discussed in the findings 
above, a good number of our participants rescued animals that had 
previously been abandoned. The belief that as a society we ought 
to protect abandoned animals, if not prevent this from occurring in 
the first instance, may well explain the Level 2 moralizing, which 
our participants directed towards those who engage in practices 
such as the treatment of animals as status objects and fashion ac-
cessories. For our participants, the underlying supposition of their 
moralization here, which was sometimes verbalised and at other 
times not, seems to be that such practices undermine the welfare 
of these animals.
In terms of insuring, this also appears to transcend Holt’s (1995) 
distinction between the autotelic and instrumental purposes of action, 
as well as his view that actions are either object or interperson-
ally structured, as the following quotes suggest. For Sheila, a key 
advantage of having pet insurance for Bryan is simply to mitigate 
against the fear of losing him–“if it gets lost, they’ll put a photo 
out and try and help you find your cat.” Claire described her fear 
of Angus causing an accident and either hurting himself or hurting 
someone else and therefore she primarily purchased insurance in 
case of “some liability claim being made.” 
As seen above, for the most part our participants engage in 
moralizing their preferences in relation to nurturing and protecting 
practices at Levels 1 and 2. Only Laura engages in expressing her 
moral judgments publicly (i.e. Level 3). 
MoRAlIZAtIoN ANd CoNSuMPtIoN PRAC-
tICES
The above findings demonstrate that Holt’s (1995) four meta-
phors serve to obscure the fact that “consumption is in essence a 
moral matter” (Wilk 2001, p.246) and therefore, we propose extend-
ing Holt’s (1995) framework to include the additional dimension 
consuming as moralization. As our analysis of the practices in which 
moralization is embedded demonstrates above, neither nurturing nor 
protecting practices divide easily into their autotelic and instrumental 
purposes. Similarly, these two practices often embrace both object 
actions and interpersonal actions. Therefore, we would argue that 
the consuming-as-moralization metaphor can only be positioned 
at the center of Holt’s framework. We accept that no single theory 
can hope to attend to consumption in its entirety nonetheless we 
believe that our proposed extensions to Holt’s (1995) typology of 
consumption practices (i.e. consuming as moralization–embed-
ded in the practices of nurturing and protecting) help to describe 
consumption practices in the context of the everyday life experi-
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ences of pet owners more fully. Moreover, it is anticipated that our 
proposed extensions will help to further align the fields of morality 
and consumer behavior. 
In terms of the various levels of moralization identified by 
Lovett and Jordan (2010), in the context of pet ownership and related 
consumption practices, the majority of consumers (i.e. pet owners) 
in this study appear to moralize their preferences at Levels 1 and 2, 
with only a very small minority engaging in level 3 moralization. 
With regard to the implications of our findings in this context for 
future cultural studies of consumption, we would suggest that the 
consuming-as-moralization metaphor is undoubtedly applicable 
to other consumption contexts. In fact, given the current concern 
regarding the levels of alcohol consumption in the UK and in the 
aftermath of the controversy in global financial markets as well as 
more general debates on rising materialism within capitalist society, 
we would expect to see a greater prevalence of level 3 moralizing 
among consumers in regard to these contexts of consumption than 
we have seen in our study of pet ownership. 
In terms of contributing to current knowledge on the role of 
morality and socio-cultural influences in relation to owners and 
their pets, overall, it is evident that our participants hold values with 
respect to the moral consequences of behavior in relation to pets, 
over and above simply adhering to the legislative requirements of 
pet-keeping. Consumer moralization seems to permeate the lived 
reality of pet ownership, with consumers in this study engaging 
in moralizing their preferences for themselves (i.e. Level 1) and 
others (i.e. Level 2). Although many of our participants appreciate 
that the UK has a more progressive stance towards the welfare of 
animals in comparison to many other countries there was still a 
sense for some participants that more needs to be done to protect 
animals from abandonment, exploitation and harm. If as Ghandi 
suggests our moral progress as a nation is to be judged by the way 
our animals are treated, then we clearly still have some way to go. 
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